






CEP Discussion Paper No 1697 
June 2020 







   
Abstract 
We study the impact of international financial flows on credit allocation exploiting the early 2000s 
boom of capital inflows in Italy. Using detailed bank-firm matched data we compare the patterns of 
credit allocation of banks with different exposure to the shock. Exposed banks significantly expand 
lending to high productivity and low credit-constraint firms. Constrained but high productivity firms 
also benefit from the shock. These results hold using alternative measures of firm productivity and 
credit constraints or of bank exposure to the flows, and do not seem to be driven by concurrent 
changes in bank funding or by the sorting of borrowers and lenders. We also find that the patterns of 
credit allocation induced by capital inflows have a positive, albeit small, impact on aggregate TFP. 
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1 Introduction
The impact of international financial flows on the real economy is one of the key questions
in international economics.1 In the early 2000s, countries in Southern Europe experienced
a strong increase in capital inflows that lasted until the global financial crisis. During
that period, they suffered from a slowdown in productivity due to misallocation of re-
sources, especially capital.2 Several papers argue that the two trends are linked and that
capital inflows had a detrimental effect on resource allocation and productivity growth.3
The implicit assumption of these studies is that capital inflows induced the banking sys-
tem to disproportionately increase lending towards less productive firms, favoring their
expansion or survival.
We contribute to the debate by looking at the impact of foreign capital inflows on the
allocation of credit by Italian banks. The analysis leverages on detailed micro data on
banks, credit, and firms. These data allow us to, first, isolate credit supply shocks in-
duced by bank exposure to the international flows and, second, determine which type
of firms benefitted the most from these inflows, i.e. whether high exposure banks dis-
proportionally allocated credit towards ex-ante less productive firms. In doing so, we
look at different measures of firm efficiency and account for alternative measures of their
riskiness or financial constraints.
Contrary to the general view in the literature, our results show that international fi-
nancial flows did not contribute to increase misallocation through the bank lending chan-
nel. If anything, they helped improve aggregate productivity. This result holds looking
at the intensive margin of credit, exploiting within firm variation in credit allocation for
continuing bank-firm relationships, at the entry and exit margin, and at the aggregate
credit supply that combine both margins. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
paper estimating the impact of international capital flows on misallocation linking them
to banks and firms’ characteristics at such granular level.
1See, among others, Prasad et al. (2007), Bonfiglioli (2008), Rodrik and Subramanian (2009), Bekaert et al.
(2011); Chari et al. (2012), Baskaya et al. (2017), di Giovanni et al. (2017), and Varela (2018).
2See Calligaris et al. (2018) for details about the productivity slowdown and misallocation in Italy,
Garcia-Santana et al. (2016) for the patterns of misallocation in Spain and Gamberoni et al. (2016) for an
overview of about misallocation trends in European countries
3See among others Gopinath et al. (2017), Benigno et al. (2015), and Reis (2013).
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It is well documented that cross-border capital flows raised rapidly in the early 2000s,
driven by favorable global financial conditions, and that this involved greatly countries
in the European Monetary Union (EMU), especially the more peripheral ones (Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti, 2007b, 2008; Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2010; Lane, 2013; Hale and Obstfeld,
2016). The Italian banking system benefitted largely from these inflows. Between 2002
and 2008 the net international investment position of banks went from -5.5% to -25.5%
of GDP. This is a large shift, which is similar to the one experienced by Spain even if the
starting point of the two countries was different (from -19% to -42% of GDP).4 Amiti et al.
(2017) decompose the raise of capital inflows into country-specific demand and supply
factors, and common global factors. They find that, especially for Italy global push factors
represent the bulk of the raise of capital inflows, which makes Italy a natural setting to
study the impact of international financial flows.
The initial step of our identification strategy is grounded on the intuition that capital
inflows would benefit disproportionately banks already relying on funding from foreign
markets. We exploit variation in ex-ante banks’ foreign liability ratio (foreign liabilities
relative to total liabilities) as a measure of their exposure to the inflows, which is similar
in spirit to the approach of Paravisini et al. (2015), di Giovanni et al. (2017), and Mian
and Sufi (2018). We provide evidence that a bank’s foreign liability ratio is a good proxy
for its share of total inflows during the boom. Exploiting banks’ heterogeneity along this
dimension, we estimate first, how bank exposure affects the supply of credit to firms, and
second whether the allocation of such credit is consistent with an increase in misalloca-
tion.5
The analysis leverages on the credit registry data for Italy covering the universe of
loans above e75,000 granted in Italy between 1998 and 2007. We exploit bank and firm
identifiers to link the credit data with detailed balance sheet information about all banks
operating in Italy and the universe of incorporated firms. This allows us to analyze credit
4A decrease of banks’ NIIP of 20% of GDP over six years, is very large also from an international per-
spective; looking at international data of both developed and developing countries, such changes are in the
top 10% of the distribution.
5As robustness, we will use two alternative measures that aim to isolate the push component of inter-
national capital flows: one is a shift-share measure exploiting bank-level information about the country of
origin of foreign funding; the other uses a time varying measure following Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2018).
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patterns controlling for key bank characteristics and looking into the allocation of credit
by firm level characteristics.
In quantifying the impact of foreign capital flows on credit, we first use the Khwaja
and Mian (2008) within-estimator to isolate credit supply from demand factors. Following
the surge in capital inflows, we estimate that high exposure banks increase credit supply
relatively more than less exposed banks lending to the same firm. Our baseline specifica-
tion indicate that a 10 p.p. increase in exposure raise credit supply by 4.0%. The results are
robust to controlling for bank characteristics that may be correlated to the share of foreign
funding or for variation in other sources of funding, they are confirmed adopting alter-
native definitions of firm exposure, or changing the timing of the shock, and withstands
a host of specification checks. Importantly, we also show that while banks’ exposure af-
fects credit supply when capital flows soar, this is not the case in the previous, normal
times. Finally, we find that foreign capital inflows are positively associated to lending
also in aggregate regressions, where a firm’s exposure to the shock is computed as the
credit-weighted average of its lenders’ exposure. A 10 p.p. increase in firm exposure is
associated to a 2.4% increase in total credit following the shock. This suggests that the
patterns of entry and exit in credit relationships were not able to undo the consequences
of banks’ exposure to the shock on lending.
We then analyze the effect of capital inflows on misallocation asking, first, which sec-
tors benefitted the most from the credit shock. Our results show that exposed banks
increase lending to firms in manufacturing industries, but not those in services or con-
struction. Hence, bank lending does not seem to contribute to misallocation along the
sectoral dimension, as argued by, for example, Reis (2013). Moreover, we do not find any
significant consequences of capital inflows on household credit.
Next, we investigate the patterns of credit supply according to firms’ ex-ante produc-
tivity, measured by marginal revenue product of capital (MRPK) and total factor revenue
productivity (TFPR), and accounting for the degree of credit constraint, proxied by firms’
fixed assets as a measure of collateral. Exposed banks disproportionally lending to low-
productivity firms would be important evidence that the surge in foreign capital flows
induces a rise in resource misallocation.
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However, we do not find that this is the case in our data. The strength of the credit
supply shock associated to capital inflows is greater for firms with ex-ante above-average
productivity. Exposed banks also increase credit to firms with higher fixed assets, which
is consistent with the existence of borrowing constraints. Size dependent borrowing con-
straints are the main mechanism linking capital flows and misallocation in models as
Gopinath et al. (2017). Unlike their case, however, our results show the tightness of such
constraints is not independent of productivity. We find that constrained but high pro-
ductivity firms do benefit from the credit shock, by an amount that is comparable to that
of unconstrained but low-productivity firms. Only the worse borrowers (i.e. those with
both low productivity and low collateral) see no increase in credit from exposed banks.
These results suggest that size-dependent borrowing constraint might not be state invari-
ant and when banks benefit from a positive funding shock, they ease credit conditions
not only depending on firm size, but also on its productivity.
In order to infer the implications of the above findings on aggregate TFP, we rely on
both the Hsieh and Klenow (2009) (HK) framework and on the aggregation approach of
Sraer and Thesmar (2018) (ST). Despite the several caveats emphasized by recent liter-
ature6, the HK framework represents an important benchmark to link misallocation, as
measured by the dispersion of firm level productivity, to aggregate TFP. On the other
hand, the ST approach provides sufficient statistics to aggregate the results of firm-level
”treatments” by taking into account general equilibrium effects. These two approaches
deliver similar results. We estimate that, absent the credit supply shock induced by inter-
national flows, aggregate TFP in Italy would have been 0.4% and 0.3% lower according to
the HK and the ST framework, respectively. While not a striking figure, this result corrob-
orates the finding that international financial flows did not curb aggregate productivity.
These results suggest that the increase of misallocation is not associated to the lending
activity of banks directly exposed to foreign flows. We also investigate the possibility
of indirect effects of capital inflows on misallocation. For one thing, banks exposed to
foreign flows can increase the liquidity of the system through interbank lending, bonds
6See Asker et al. (2014), De Loecker and Goldberg (2014), Haltiwanger (2016), Bils et al. (2018), Halti-
wanger et al. (2018), David and Venkateswaran (2019) for discussions about the limitations of the HK ap-
proach.
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and equity acquisition, which in turn might favor a higher flow of credit to less productive
firms. We do not find evidence of spillover effects from exposed to non-exposed banks,
however. For instance interbank lending did not increase across banking groups and there
was no surge in bonds or equity financing from exposed to non-exposed banks. Moreover,
we do not find a significant effect on the share of deposits to less exposed banks, which
could have been associated to capital inflows feeding into changes of banks’ retail policy.
We also test whether capital inflows made banks more fragile after 2008, as the boom
stopped and foreign funding began to decline rapidly. We do not find that this was the
case: despite the increase in lending in the previous period, exposed banks did not suffer
from higher NPLs once the global financial crisis erupted.
Finding that capital inflows had a mild positive impact on resource allocation leaves
the question of what explains the rise of misallocation, in Italy and other Southern Euro-
pean countries, unanswered. While a full explanation of this issue goes beyond the scope
of this paper, in the final section we briefly discuss some potentially fruitful avenues for
research seeking to understand this issue further.
The paper contributes to the literature on the effects of capital inflows in Southern Eu-
rope on productivity and misallocation. Gopinath et al. (2017) argue that capital flows led
to a decline in the real interest rate, which favored debt accumulation by firms with higher
net-worth that were financially unconstrained, but these firms were also less productive;
so capital inflows got directed to firms with lower marginal product of capital, with nega-
tive effects on aggregate productivity. Similarly, Benigno and Fornaro (2014) and Benigno
et al. (2015) show that foreign capital flows trigger a consumption boom and the shift of
productive resources toward the non-tradable sector at the expenses of the tradable one
generating stagnant productivity growth. A similar story is proposed by Reis (2013) for
the case of Portugal, where he also argues that abundant capital flows were misallocated
causing a slump due to the expansion of the unproductive non-tradable sector.
Our difference with respect to these papers is that, we are able to empirically identify
the supply shock of credit from banks to firms that is induced by international capital in-
flows, and track the firms that banks have lent most funds to. We do not find evidence that
foreign capital inflows increased misallocation, as the relative supply of credit increased
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disproportionally in favor of the more productive firms. Our results are consistent with
the findings of, among others, Buera et al. (2011), Moll (2014), and Buera and Shin (2017),
where a lower degree of credit constraint, which in our case becomes less binding thanks
to the higher supply of foreign funding, favors firms and sectors with higher productivity.
More broadly our paper contributes to the literature on the effects of foreign capital
flows on the real economy such as Prasad et al. (2007), Bonfiglioli (2008), Rodrik and Sub-
ramanian (2009), Bekaert et al. (2011); Chari et al. (2012), Baskaya et al. (2017), di Giovanni
et al. (2017), and Varela (2018). Relative to these papers we are able to directly link foreign
flows to local banks and then to firms, observing also their characteristics. This allows us
to speak about the effects of capital flows on misallocation. Moreover, our study captures
the impact of capital inflows on a developed economy subject to a loose global financial
cycle, whereas the literature focused on emerging countries and mostly on episodes of
financial liberalization.
The paper speaks also to the literature that analyzes capital flows and the EMU such
as, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007a); Spiegel (2009); Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2010); Lane
(2013); and Hale and Obstfeld (2016). Our contribution is to look into the effect of these
flows on local banking and productivity. Finally, the paper contributes to the extensive
literature on the effects of shocks to bank fundings such as Khwaja and Mian (2008), Par-
avisini (2008), Amiti and Weinstein (2011), Schnabl (2012), Jiménez et al. (2014), Chodorow-
Reich (2014), Paravisini et al. (2015), Cingano et al. (2016), Mian et al. (2017), Amiti and
Weinstein (2018). The contribution of this paper is to look at a different type of bank
shock, such as the effects of a boom in foreign capital inflows as a result of a loose global
financial cycle.
The paper is structured as following: Section 3 presents the data; Section 2 discusses
the empirical strategy; Section 4 presents the results; Section 5 looks at the aggregate
implication on TFP; Section 6 analyzes the robustness of our results along several dimen-
sions; and Section 7 concludes.
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2 Empirical strategy
2.1 The rise of capital inflows, a supply side story
The acceleration of capital inflows from 2002 to 2007 in Southern European countries
has been documented by an extensive set of research. The extent to which these flows
involved banks is exemplified in Figure 1 plotting the dynamics of gross foreign liabil-
ities and claims of banks in Italy between 1998 and 2008. Until 2002 foreign liabilities
remained stable, but then increased by almost four folds up to the global financial cri-
sis. The increase was not matched by a raise of foreign assets, and thus translated into
more funding available in the domestic economy. The majority of the foreign funding
took the form of loans denominated in euro, i.e. with no currency risk relative to as-
sets, and had an average maturity around 12 months. The aggregate trends are similar
to those experienced by other European countries, as Spain, and underpin the idea of
foreign capital-induced misallocation.
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007b) and Lane (2013) show that the increase in cross-border
flows was part of a general international pattern associated to global factors such as the
surge of securitisation, that increased banks’ liquidity for further lending, and the de-
cline in global uncertainty, as exemplified by the decline of the VIX in that period. In the
Euro area the rise of cross border flows was particularly remarkable as the common cur-
rency stimulated international financial integration (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2010) and Eu-
ropean banks were frontrunners in the surge of securitization (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti,
2008). More specifically, Hale and Obstfeld (2016) documented how, leveraging on for-
eign funds, banks from core Eurozone countries increased their lending to the banks of
peripheral countries in the Euro area.
The literature stresses that the rise of capital inflows in Southern European countries is
mainly due to global supply factors. Amiti et al. (2017) look more in details at the determi-
nants of movements of international banking flows. Using the methodology developed
in Amiti and Weinstein (2018), they decompose the growth in international bank credit
of various countries into shocks common to all countries, idiosyncratic demand shocks
specific to the borrower country and idiosyncratic supply shocks to a borrower’s country
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creditor banks. Their analysis shows that, in the case of Italy, the surge in foreign capital
inflows was largely driven by global factors (see Figure 3). This is not necessarily true
for other Southern European countries such as Spain where idiosyncratic demand factors
played a prominent role. From this point of view, Italy offers an ideal setting to study the
effects of foreign capital inflows.
2.2 Lender-level exposure to foreign capital
Financial institutions rely on a number of sources of financing when originating loans.
The literature suggests that there are relevant distinctions between banks that rely on core
deposits versus non-core liabilities. Hahm et al. (2013) show that non-core financing is as-
sociated with greater risk taking in the banking sector. Hanson et al. (2015) and Drechsler
et al. (2017) argue that financial institutions that rely more heavily on core deposits are
less prone to runs and costs shocks due to monetary policy.
Our empirical approach rests on the idea that the surge of international capital flows
between 2002 and 2007 offered greater funding opportunities to banks featuring a higher
liability share of foreign funding before the shock.7 One relevant underlying assumption
of this approach is that there is some stickiness in the liability structure of banks.
Figure 2 shows that there is a strong correlation between how much a bank used to
fund itself from abroad (foreign liability ratio in 1998-2000, horizzontal axis) and how
much it actually benefitted from capital inflows (bank’s share of total inflows after 2002,
vertical axis). Panel A looks at this relation unconditionally, whereas Panel B controls for
key bank characteristics measured in the first period.8 In both cases we observe a positive
and significant correlation between the two variables. This suggests that the intensity of
foreign financing in the years pre-capital inflows boom is a good proxy to measure banks’
7The source of variation that we exploit is similar to that of Paravisini et al. (2015), di Giovanni et al.
(2017), and Mian and Sufi (2018). The former looks at the effects of capital flows reversal in Peru and
measure bank exposure to capital outflows as the share of foreign liability before the global financial crisis.
The second, analyzes the transmission of the Global Financial Cycle to the local credit market in Turkey
and measures banks exposure as the share of non-deposit liabilities. Finally, the latter exploits the fact that
US lenders which relied on non-core deposits in their liability structure pre-2002 are the ones that benefited
more from the global rise of shadow banking and private label securitisation post-2003.
8These include log-assets, as a proxy for bank size; the share of core liabilities, to capture the relevance
of deposit funding in the liability structure; capital ratio, as a proxy for leverage; and the share of NPLs, to
control for bank vulnerability.
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exposure to the raise in international flows in the years 2002-2007.
Table 1 provides further support for this approach with cross-sectional bank level re-
gressions. Column 1 reports the regression coefficient plotted in Figure 2-B. The second
column confirms the significant positive correlation between ex-ante foreign liability ratio
and exposure to capital inflows using a different dependent variable, the growth of the
foreign liability ratio between the pre- and post-2002 periods. Column 3 finally checks
the stickiness of the liability structure of banks looking at the persistence of banks’ rank-
ing by foreign liability ratio: a regression of the ranking as of 1998-2000 on the ranking
as of 2002-2007 delivers a coefficient of 0.75. There are potentially several causes of such
persistence, e.g. fixed costs to engage foreign funding, but it is reassuring that the share
of foreign liabilities ex-ante captures well the heterogeneity of exposure to capital flows
ex-post.
While our baseline approach relies on existing evidence as to the drivers and dating
of the surge of foreign capital flows to Italy, we look at alternative approaches allowing
for more flexibility in both dimensions. First, we employ a shift-share measure of expo-
sure exploiting bank-level information on the country of origin of foreign funding. This
allows predicting the exposure of an Italian bank as a weighted average of how much for-
eign countries are exporting capital in general (the “shift”), with weights that come from
the initial bank composition of inflow by country of origin (the “shares”). Second, we
construct a time varying measure of bank exposure isolating a shock of capital inflows
induced by push factors as in Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2018) (see Section 6 for details). Our
results are confirmed using these alternative measures.
Identification also rests on the assumption that bank exposure to capital inflows does
not correlates with unobserved determinants of credit supply. Table 2 looks at the balanc-
ing of observable characteristic of banks (i.e. their size or balance sheet composition) and
of their borrower (for example, in terms of productivity) between high-exposure and low-
exposure banks (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2008). The characteristics of the average bor-
rower across the two groups show a high degree of overlap, which suggests that sorting
between banks and firms is unlikely to drive our results. While normalized differences
lay within the commonly accepted 0.25 threshold, the degree of overlap is less satisfactory
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in the case of some banks characteristics. To account for their potential concurring effect
in the estimation of the lending channel from capital inflows, our baseline specification
will allow for a differential impact of each such variable on credit.
2.3 Foreign capital flows and credit supply
Our empirical approach firstly relies on the Khwaja and Mian (2008) within estimator
allowing to isolate demand and supply of credit. The estimator exploits the fact that the
vast majority of firms (about 75% of firms in our sample) borrow from multiple banks,
which allows comparing the dynamic of credit granted by banks with different exposures
to the same firm:
lnCibt = β1 Exposureb × Postt + β2 Specibt +X
′
bδ × Postt + αit + γib + εibt (1)
The dependent variable is the log of outstanding credit granted by bank b to firm i at
the end of year t. The variableExposureb measures the ex-ante share of foreign funding in
bank’s liability over the 1998-2000 period, and it is interacted with a dummy equal to one
for the years after the boom in capital inflows (2002-2007), and zero for the earlier years
(Postt). The specification includes a full set of firm-year fixed-effects (αit) which control
for any firm-specific shock potentially affecting credit demand (expected to be common
across all banks). Because demand shocks may not be equally distributed across banks
in expectation (Paravisini et al., 2017), the specification also includes Specibt, a dummy
equal to 1 if a firm operates in a sector where a bank is specialized into.9 We also con-
trol for potential non-random matching between firms and banks by including a set of
firm-bank fixed effects (γib). These fixed effects capture all time-invariant factors that may
affect credit for any bank-firm pair such as relational banking and time invariant drivers
of sorting between banks and firms. Finally, the specification accounts for potentially
confounding determinants of changes in credit supply, interacting a set of bank charac-
teristics with the post dummy.10 Given that our source of variation is at the bank level and
9A bank is considered to be specialized in one sector if its share of loans in that sector is above the
interquartile range of all the other banks in the economy.
10These include log-assets as a proxy of bank size; the share of NPLs, to captures bank performance and
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that firms’ demand for specific banks can vary according to the sector of specialization of
the bank, we cluster the standard errors at the bank-sector (2 digits) level.11
The coefficient of interest is β1, which captures the marginal effect of bank exposure
on credit supply, following the surge in capital inflows. Given the presence of firm-year
fixed effects, our source of identification relies on within firm variation of credit across
multiple lenders with different degree of exposure. The firm-year fixed effects, combined
with the bank-specialization dummy, absorb firm level shocks that affect the demand of
credit, so β1 represents a credit supply shock due to bank’s exposure to capital inflows.
To assess the relevance of pre-trends across banks that could be associated to different
bank characteristics and drive our results, we also estimate a dynamic diff-in-diff. This
allows us to look into the full dynamics of credit supply between 1998 and 2007, and to
show in a transparent way how this varies for the years before and after the boom in
capital inflows.12
One concern is that Equation 1 only captures the intensive margin of credit, as it only
accounts for bank-firm relations that exist before and after the boom of capital inflows.
However, we are also interested in the effects on the extensive margin. For this reason we
run the following specification:
Entryibτ (Exitibτ ) = β1 Exposureb ∗×Postτ +β2 Specibτ +X
′
bδ×Postτ +αiτ +γb+ εibτ (2)
where the dependent variable takes the value of one if bank b and firm i starts (exit) a
lending relation after the boom of capital inflows. This is a two-period panel, τ = 1, 2
refers to the years pre- and post-2002. The coefficient of interest β1 captures the marginal
effect of bank’s exposure to foreign capital on the probability that the bank starts (ends)
management; bank core liabilities, which control for the funding structure of the bank; and the capital ratio,
which controls for the degree of bank leverage. All variables are average values (1998-2000).
11As a robustness, we run specification 1 using a balanced panel only and results are confirmed (see Table
A1 in the Appendix). We also compute Equation (1) in first difference by taking the average of the pre- and
post- period for the variables of interest, as in the original paper of Khwaja and Mian (2008). This makes
the standard errors robust to possible concerns of auto-correlation as highlighted by Bertrand et al. (2004).
Specifically, we run: ∆ lnCib = β1 Exposureb + β2 ∆Specib + X
′
bδ + αi + εib. Results are confirmed, see
Table A2 in the Appendix for details.









where βq capture the year-by-year effect of bank exposure.
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a credit relation with firm i after the shock. The specification controls for whether the
bank is specialized in the sector the firm operates, for bank’s pre-characteristics, and for
firm-time fixed effects, and for bank fixed effects; errors are clustered at the bank-sector
(2-digits) level.
Another concern is that a raise in credit supply from more exposed banks could be
compensated by a decline of credit from less exposed ones, so there may not be an effect
on the aggregate amount of credit that a firm receives. In order to investigate this pos-
sibility, we compute the exposure of firms to the bank lending channel of international
financial flows, as the weighted average of the exposure of all the banks a firm:







With this measure in hand, we look at the effect of firm exposure on the aggregate credit
of a firm by running:
lnCist = β1 Exposure F irmi × Postt + α̂it + γi + δst + εist (4)
the overall amount of loans received by firm i at year t is regressed on firm fixed effects,
sector-time fixed effects and the interaction between firm exposure to credit supply shock
and the post-2002 dummy. This specification includes also the firm-time fixed effects
estimated in Equation 1, as a proxy of credit demand by firms.
The set of specifications presented in this section should give us a complete picture
of the credit effect of a trade shock. Equation 1 allows us to distinguish neatly between
supply and demand effects; Equation 2 accounts for the extensive margin of credit; and
Equation 4 looks into the effect on the aggregate credit that a firm receives. In the follow-
ing sections we also look into the effect of the trade shock on the total credit that a firm
receives and its effect misallocation.
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2.4 Credit supply and misallocation
We next investigate whether the patterns of credit supply induced by foreign capital
inflows are compatible with an increase in resource misallocation. Specifically, we ask
whether exposed banks tilted the composition of their credit portfolio towards low pro-
ductivity firms. We also explore the role of borrowing constraints, the main mechanism
preventing an optimal allocation of resources toward high productivity firms in the lit-
erature linking financial friction to misallocation.13 Recent studies suggest they played a
relevant role for the productivity slowdown in peripheral Europe following the launch of
the common currency (Reis, 2013; Benigno and Fornaro, 2014; Benigno et al., 2015; Dias
et al., 2016; Gopinath et al., 2017).
A simple way to nest the insights of these papers into our framework is to assume that
a bank’s supply shock varies with borrowers’ characteristics. One natural firm dimen-
sion to look at in our context is productivity: finding that exposed banks passed along
the shock more to low productivity firms would confirm that foreign capital inflows con-
tributed to dampen aggregate efficiency in Italy through bank lending. We measure firm
productivity based on alternative indexes (TFPR, MRPK, or value added per worker)
computed before the shock, and group our sample according to whether the firms have
productivity above or below their 3-digit industry average (high and low productivity
borrowers).14 We allow for heterogeneity in the strength of credit supply shocks simply






i (Exposureb × Postt) + β2 Specibt +X
′
bδ × Postt + αit + γib + εibt (5)
where Ddi is an indicator distinguishing high productivity borrowers from low pro-
ductivity borrowers. This specification captures credit misallocation along the intensive
13The role of financial frictions on aggregate productivity is well developed by, among others, Banerjee
and Duflo (2005); Buera et al. (2011); Reis (2013); Midrigan and Xu (2014); Moll (2014); Buera and Moll
(2015); Buera and Shin (2017); Gopinath et al. (2017); Varela (2018); David and Venkateswaran (2019).
14Using the overall mean in the sample to distinguish firms with different productivity does not affect
our findings. We thank Simone Lenzu and Francesco Manaresi for sharing their data on TFPR and MRPK
on the CERVED sample. TFPR is computed following the methodology of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and
Wooldridge (2009) and MRPK is estimated following De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). See Lenzu and
Manaresi (2018) for further details.
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margin, but we run similar specifications for Equations 2 and 4 to look also at the ex-
tensive margin and aggregate credit respectively. Estimating βL > βH would reveal that
exposed banks disproportionately allocated funds to relatively less productive firms fol-
lowing the shock.15 This would be consistent with the idea that capital inflows ended up
dampening aggregate TFP through credit misallocation.
To study the relevance of credit constraints we exploit the idea that they should be
less stringent, on average, for firms with high collateral availability. We therefore also
explore the relevance of borrowers’ pledgeable (fixed) assets in banks credit allocation
decisions. Our simple framework is illustrated in Figure 4 where the set of borrowers
is now split into four groups along the productivity and collateral dimensions, and we






i with d = HH,LH,LL,HL (for the two dimensions of productivity and
collateral, respectively).16
In a simple world in which credit is optimally allocated across projects accounting for
the risk-return trade-off, a reduction in the cost of funding should favour the financing
of projects by high-productive and high-collateral (low risk) firms (1st quadrant). Banks
pursuing a balanced expansion of their portfolios should also pass along their shocks to
high-collateral but low-productivity firms, and to low-collateral high-productivity firms
(βL,H ∼= βH,L). However, if lending is severely constrained by the availability of collateral,
it would be large firms in the 3rd quadrant to disproportionately benefit from the easing
of credit conditions (βL,H > βH,L). Such pattern should be particularly evident if credit
allocation is subject to size-dependent borrowing constraints (as in Gopinath et al. (2017) )
so that a firm’s ability to borrow disproportionately increases in its size. Finally, the credit
expansion should not (or only to a limited extent) concern low-productive constrained
firms (βL,L ≈ 0).
Lastly, following the insights of the literature (Reis, 2013; Benigno and Fornaro, 2014;
15Because the lending activity of banks is forward looking, we also considered a classification based on
firms’ realized productivity at the end of our sample period (see the robustness section).
16There is not much overlap between these firm level characteristics. For instance the correlation between
marginal product of capital and total fixed assets is -0.27, which is sufficiently low to ensure that firms with a
high MRPK ex-ante are not also the ones with low collateral to start with. Similarly, the correlation between
MRPK and other measures of risk, such as credit score, is -0.05, which is very low.
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Benigno et al., 2015), we also look at the sectoral dimension of misallocation, focusing in
particular on the strength of credit supply shocks in services and construction relative to
manufactures.
3 Data
Our analysis is based on a matched loan-bank-firm dataset containing information on
bank credit for a large sample of Italian companies. The final dataset is obtained by com-
bining three sources: credit register; banks’ balance sheets data; firms’ balance sheets
data.
The first source is the Italian Credit Register administered by the Bank of Italy, which
contains a monthly panel of the outstanding debt of every borrower (firms or individuals)
with loans above EUR 75,000 with each bank operating in Italy. We focus on non-financial
corporations and build an annual bank-firm panel, where loans are measured as the out-
standing credit granted at the end of a given year. As banks use the credit register in order
to assess the creditworthiness of their current or prospective borrowers, its data quality
is very high.
Banks’ balance sheet data are from the Bank of Italy Supervisory reports, which pro-
vide detailed data on banks’ assets and liabilities, including details about banks’ foreign
funding. Whenever a bank ceases to exist, due to either bankruptcy or merger, firms
will cease reporting that bank as a source of loans. Firms’ balance sheet data (includ-
ing variables such as revenues, investment, employment, wage bill) are taken from the
CERVED database, which covers the universe of incorporated firms in Italy. We match
the bank-firm loan data to banks’ and firms’ balance sheet data using unique bank and
firm identifiers, respectively.
Lending and funding policies of banks are typically decided at the banking group
level, so we consolidate banks’ balance sheet at the group level, as this is the relevant
unit of observation to analyze the dynamics of credit supply. This implies that if a firm
borrows from two banks of the same group, we consider this as a single relationship given
by the sum of the two loans. We also keep track of mergers and acquisition among banks.
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If a firm is borrowing from a bank, and the bank disappears because it is acquired or
merged, we track if there is a new relationship with the newly formed bank, or with the
acquirer, in which case we consider the relationship as still existing. This ensures that we
do not have any gaps associated with mergers.
Table 3 shows the summary statistics of banks and firms characteristics in our sam-
ple. The unit of observation in our empirical analysis is at the bank-firm-year level. The
dataset includes, on average, about 500 banks and 86 thousand manufacturing firms per
year. The simple average of the share of banks’ foreign liability is 3.7% and the standard
deviation 13.1%. The distribution of banks’ foreign funding shows that many banks,
mostly the small ones, are not exposed to international financial markets; hence, as a
robustness, we drop banks with no-exposure or exposure below 2% and the results go
through. Finally, it is important to notice that multiple banking is very common in Italy,
also among small firms. About 75% of firms in our sample borrow from multiple banks,
which is an essential feature of our identification strategy, and the average number of
banking relations per firm is 3.4.
4 Results
4.1 Capital inflows and credit supply
Table 4 reports our baseline results on the intensive margin of credit supply. The five
columns refers to alternative a specifications of the within-firm regression 1, testing whether
banks exposed to foreign capital inflows increased their lending relative to less exposed
banks when looking at the same firm. Column 1 shows that this is the case in the baseline
specification, when exposure is measured by a bank’s ratio of foreign liabilities before the
shock. The estimated coefficient implies that a 10 percentage point increase in this ratio
implies a 4% increase in lending between the pre- and post-years. In columns (2) and (3)
banks’ exposure is captured by a an indicator variable for banks with a share of foreign
liabilities above 10% and 15% respectively. This is meant to account for potential non-
linearities of the effects of foreign funding. In both cases, the treated banks increase credit
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supply by 7% relative to control banks. In column (4) we check for the relevance of the
large number of small banks with limited access to foreign capital flows in our sample,
restricting the analysis to those with exposure larger than a minimum threshold (here,
2%). Finally, in column (5) we check the relevance of firm size, weighting the least square
estimates by firm revenues. In either case, the results are unaffected.
Figure 5 plots the marginal effect of bank exposure on credit supply estimated every
year between 1998 and 2007. While the differential supply of credit between exposed
and non-exposed banks shows no clear pattern until 2002, it displays a positive trend
following the surge in foreign capital inflows.
We next look at the effects of foreign capital inflows on the extensive margin of credit,
estimating the effects of bank exposure on the probability to terminate an existing credit
relation and on the probability to start a new relation. The results in Table 5 show that
exposed banks are less likely to terminate a credit relation (columns 1 and 2) and more
likely to enter a new relation with an existing firm (columns 3 and 4). Both results hold
using the linear and the dummy variable exposure measures. The estimated coefficients
imply that a 10 p.p. increase in exposure is associated to 1.1% lower probability to stop
lending to a given firm and a 1.9% higher probability to start a new credit relation.
In Table 6 we extend our analysis to estimate the impact of firm exposure to foreign
capital (the weighted average of bank exposure computed across the firm’s lenders) on
total credit (Equation 4). If clients of low exposure banks were able to promptly switch to
lenders who benefit from the shock then there would be little or no dependence between
aggregate credit and initial firm exposure. The results in Table 6 suggest this is not the
case: a 10 p.p. increase in firm exposure before the shock is associated to a 2.4% increase
in credit afterwards (column 1). The other columns replicate the specification changes
of Table 4 confirming the baseline finding. The estimates being smaller than those of
the firm-bank level specification in Table 4 suggests some credit substitution, which is
however unable to undo the transmission of the shock to borrowers.
18
4.2 Capital inflows and misallocation
We first look at the between-industry dimension emphasized in the literature, testing
whether the credit supply shock associated to foreign capital was stronger in relatively
less productive industries. Table 7 reports the results obtained running the baseline
within firm specification in Equation 1 for each macro industry. Our evidence suggests
that exposed banks increase their lending to manufacturing firms relative to other banks
(column 1), but not to firms in construction or services (columns 2 and 3). This result
is consistent with Gopinath et al. (2017) who focus their analysis on capital flows and
misallocation within manufacturing.
These findings are confirmed when looking at the extensive margin (Table 8). While
high exposure banks reduce the exit rates of their existing relationships, the effect is sig-
nificantly larger for firms in manufacturing (column 5), than in services and construction
(columns 6 and 7). The former also benefit from a higher probability of starting a credit
relation (column 1). The fact that capital inflows translate into more credit for firms in
the manufacturing sector, but not for those in services and construction is confirmed in
Table 9, where we analyze the effect of firms exposure to the bank lending channel on the
aggregate credit.
We next analyze the allocation of credit across firms. The results in Table 10 refer to the
specification in Equation 5, which allows for heterogeneous credit supply shocks across
firms with different productivity and credit constraint. Columns 1 and 2 show that loans
by exposed banks are, if anything, disproportionally allocated to firms with above indus-
try level of MRPK and TFPR: a 10 p.p. increase of bank exposure translates into a raise
in credit by 4.4% for high-MRPK (4.6%, high-TFPR) and by 3.4% for low-MRPK (2.6%,
low-TFPR). In both cases the difference between the two groups is statistically significant
at conventional thresholds. These results, which are confirmed using simpler measures
of firm performance such as sales per capita or returns on assets, are not compatible with
capital inflows increasing misallocation through the bank-lending channel.
We also find that the supply shock is significantly stronger for firms with high collat-
eral (column 3), which is consistent with the size dependent borrowing constraint em-
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phasised by Gopinath et al. (2017). However, when decomposing our sample accounting
for both productivity and collateral constraint, we do not find evidence that collateral
availability is a necessary condition for being granted more credit. The results in columns
4 and 5 show that, in fact, low-collateral but productive firms see their credit supply in-
crease, suggesting that the size dependent borrowing constraint is not state invariant.
Interestingly, the strength of the shock is statistically equal to that experienced by uncon-
strained (high collateral) low productive firms, suggesting an allocation policy balancing
risk and returns in the portfolio. Accordingly, exposed banks do not increase lending to
risky and low productive firms, while credit increase the most for unconstrained high-
productivity borrowers.
In Table 11 we look at the extensive margin of credit. On the exit side, the results
show that banks more exposed to capital inflows have a lower probability to terminate a
relationship with more productive firms, even if these have low-collateral (columns 1-3);
so, this channel is unlikely to have contributed to higher misallocation. The results are
more mixed when we look at firms’ entry (columns 4-7). We find that exposed banks are
more likely to start a credit relation with more productive but also to more risky firms
(column 2). In this case a 10 p.p. increase in bank exposure raises the probability of
entry, over a 5 year horizon, by 3.6%. However, given that the unconditional probability
of entry in the post post period is 30%, this is not a very large increase. Moreover, the
size of the new loans granted to less productive firms is smaller than that of productive
firms.17 Finally, if we look at the effects in terms of net-entry (probability of entry minus
probability of exit), the results are not different across type of firms. Taken together these
results suggest that it is unlikely that foreign capital flows increased misallocation in any
substantial way through the extensive margin of credit.
Next, to combine both the intensive and the extensive margin, we look at the aggre-
gate effect on credit. In Table 12 we analyze the impact of capital inflows on misallocation
on the aggregate credit of firms. The results account for both the intensive and extensive
margin and confirm that the more productive and more collateralised firms are the ones
that benefited more for the higher supply of credit by exposed banks. This supports the
17Results available upon request.
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evidence that there is no direct link between foreign capital inflows and credit misalloca-
tion by banks.
4.3 A focus on household lending
Foreign capital may also induce higher lending to households, especially through mort-
gages. To test whether this is the case in our setting, we use an empirical approach similar
to that of Greenstone et al. (2014) and Gilchrist et al. (2017); because households rarely bor-
row from two or more banks, identification exploits bank lending in multiple provinces:
lnCHpbt = β1 Exposureb × Postt +X
′
bδ × Postt + αpt + γpb + εpbt (6)
The dependent variable is the log of outstanding credit from bank b to households in
province p in year t. The specification include province-time fixed effects to control for lo-
cal shocks to credit demand, and province-bank fixed effects accounting for the sorting of
banks in specific provinces. The vectorXb contains the same set of pre-2002 bank controls
used in the previous specifications with banks’ characteristics and β1 is our coefficient of
interest, estimated with weighted least-squares (WLS).18
The results reported in Table 13 show that exposed banks do not significantly increase
household credit supply relative to other banks (column 1). The result holds also look-
ing at the dummy variable definition of exposure, capturing non linearities of capital in-
flows exposure, which if anything would lead to the opposite conclusion (column 2 and
3). Hence, while Italy did see a considerable expansion in household lending after 2002,
based on our results, this was not associated to the boom in foreign capital inflows.
18We estimate eq.6 using the geometric average of two different sets of weights. The first captures the




pbt, the second captures the impor-




pbt. A high b-weight
implies that the market share of home mortgage lending of bank b in province p is high, so it is useful to
capture the impact of bank-specific credit supply shocks. Observations with relatively high c-weights are
useful in identifying the county-specific credit demand effects.
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5 Implications on aggregate misallocation and TFP
In this section we provide evidence of the aggregate effects of capital inflows on mis-
allocation and TFP in Italy. We proceed in three steps. First, we run a reduced form
estimation to check if exposure to capital inflows lead to convergence or divergence of
the marginal product of capital across firms. Then, we follow the approach of Hsieh and
Klenow (2009), an important benchmark in the misallocation literature, to infer the aggre-
gate TFP gain/loss implied by financial flows. Finally, we cast the previous estimate in
the framework of Sraer and Thesmar (2018), allowing to account for general equilibrium
effects.
If international financial flows are associated to an increase in misallocation, we should
observe divergence in the distribution of marginal product of capital across firms: MRPK
should decrease (increase) at firms with low (high) initial returns. We check the impact of
firm exposure to capital flows on MRPK in a specification similar to regression 4 (see Table
14). In the full sample, the estimated effect of bank exposure on productivity is negative,
albeit not statistically significant (column 1). However, this aggregate result masks im-
portant heterogeneity across firms. Those with above median MRPK before the shock see
their marginal revenue product of capital decrease when borrowing from exposed banks
(column 2). For low ex-ante MRPK firms, the estimated coefficient is negative and non-
statistically significant. These findings are consistent with the idea that capital inflows
contributed to decrease MRPK dispersion across Italian firms.
To gauge the aggregate consequences of international financial flows through resource
allocation we first rely on the Hsieh and Klenow (2009) (HK) framework. There, one
can express aggregate TFP gains or losses as a function of changes in the dispersion of
productivity across firms, which is interpreted as a measure of resource misallocation.19
19There are several caveats associated to the HK measure of misallocation. Asker et al. (2014) argue
that, in the presence of adjustment costs in investment, transitory idiosyncratic TFP shocks across firms
naturally generate dispersion in productivity without this implying inefficiency. De Loecker and Goldberg
(2014) and Haltiwanger (2016) argue that much of the variation in revenue-based TFP reflects demand shifts
and market power rather than allocative inefficiency. Bils et al. (2018) stress the role of mismeasurement of
factors’ marginal product in the calculation of misallocation. Finally, Haltiwanger et al. (2018) show that
the HK model can map observed production behaviors to inefficient wedges/distortions only under strict
theoretical assumptions that may not hold in all cases. David and Venkateswaran (2019) show that for
the US firms’ adjustment costs could explain only a small fraction of dispersion in productivities and that
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We implement their method in a simple exercise comparing the actual dispersion of TFPR
(var(lnTFPRi)) during the boom of capital inflows with the counterfactual dispersion of
firm-level productivity without the credit shock (var( ̂lnTFPRi, see Appendix A.1 for
details).20 With these quantities, TFP gains can be expressed as:
TFP Gain = ̂lnTFP − lnTFP = σ
2
[var( ̂lnTFPRi)− var(lnTFPRi)] (7)
Our estimates imply that foreign capital inflows decrease the dispersion of TFPR, trans-
lating in an aggregate TFP gain of 0.4% in the post-2002 period. To weigh the magnitude
of this effect, using the HK framework Calligaris et al. (2018) find that the increase of
aggregate misallocation in the Italian economy led to a 1% TFP loss in the same period.
The HK framework does not take into account general equilibrium effects, which typ-
ically dampen firm-level responses. For instance, the fact that high-MRPK firms receive
more credit, may lead to an increase in labor demand by these firms, raise the equilib-
rium wage, and therefore mitigate the potential expansion of such firms. In this respect
the previous results would be an upper bound of the aggregate effect on TFP.
Sraer and Thesmar (2018) propose a framework to aggregate firm level responses to a
shock accounting for general equilibrium effects. Their framework features heterogenous
firms subject to generic capital frictions such as adjustment costs, taxes and financing
constraints, which are altered by a policy shock. In our setting, the shock is induced by
capital inflows that relax firms’ credit constraints depending on the exposure of banks
they borrow from (the firm level exposure in Equation 3). Sraer and Thesmar (2018) show
that the effects of such shock on aggregate TFP can be expressed as a function of three
sufficient statistics of MRPK and TFPR:
TFP Gain = F
(
Λ, ∆̂µmrpk, ∆̂σ2mrpk, ̂∆σmrpk,tfpr
)
(8)
In other words, the general equilibrium impact of capital inflows on aggregate TFP can
markups could account for about 28% of the overall productivity dispersion.
20In practice, we computed ̂lnTFPRist = lnTFPRist − β̂1 Exposure F irmi, where β1 is the estimated
productivity effect of bank exposure lnTFPRist = β1 Exposure F irmi×Postt+X
′
iδ×Postt+γi+δst+εist.
The moment var( ̂lnTFPRi) is computed for the post-2002 period.
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can be expressed as a function of the effects of the shock on the mean and the variance
of MRPK (∆̂µmrpk and ∆̂σ2mrpk, respectively ), and on the covariance between MRPK and
TFPR ( ̂∆σmrpk,tfpr), as well as the parameters of the model (Λ).21
Following their methodology, we find that firm exposure to international financial
flows increased aggregate TFP by 0.3% in the post period, which is very similar, although
smaller, to that obtained in the HK framework. The fact that different approaches deliver
close results is comforting about the robustness of the finding, and confirms that capital
flows did not contribute to misallocation through the bank lending channel.
6 Robustness
We run an extensive set of robustness checks with alternative specifications, measures of
banks’ exposure, and firms’ classification. In the Appendix we report our main results
using alternative econometric specifications. In Table A1 we estimate the baseline spec-
ification in Equation 5 using a balanced panel. In Table A2 we estimate Equation 5 as a
first difference transformation, which makes the standard errors robust to possible con-
cerns of auto-correlation as highlighted by Bertrand et al. (2004). Then, in Table A3 we
add bank-time fixed effects to specification 5, which allows to control for any other shock
that can hit a bank in a given year. The results of the paper hold across these alternative
specifications.
In this section we focus our robustness analysis on five further aspects. First we look
at threat to identification coming from confounding factors. Then, we explore alternative
measures of bank exposure to international financial flows. Next, we check robustness
to different proxies of firm-level productivity and credit constraint typically used in the
literature. Further, we investigate whether spillover across banks can affect our results.
Finally, we analyse if banks more exposed to international financial flows turn to be more
fragile after the global financial crisis.
21See Appendix A.2 for more details on the approach, and on the estimates involved to compute the TFP
gain in our case.
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6.1 Omitted variable bias and confounding factors
Potential threats to identification stem from simultaneous shocks correlated with bank
exposure to foreign capital flows. We are particularly concerned about i) the raise of
securitisation in the early 2000s; ii) a sharp decrease of GDP growth in 2002-03; and iii)
banks’ exposure to the China shock. Table 15 reports the results obtained accounting for
these potential confounds, augmenting the baseline specification (col.1) with indexes of
banks’ exposure to these alternative drivers of credit supply decisions (cols. 2 to 4).
In column 2 we allow banks propensity to securitization before the shock (the average
share of securitized lending in 2001) to affect credit supply after 2002. Because securitiza-
tion affects available liquidity it might also spur an increase in credit supply, which would
bias our estimates if securitization is correlated to reliance on foreign funding. Column 3
accounts for bank exposure to the slowdown, measured by the share of outstanding loans
to the sectors that were most affected by the GDP slowdown, identified by taking indus-
try level changes in revenues in 2002-03 relative to 2000-01. Finally, column 4 accounts
for banks’ exposure to the industries that most suffered the trade shock following China
entrance in the WTO as in Federico et al. (2020).
The results in Table 15 show that our core finding on the impact of bank exposure to
capital inflows on credit supply is robust to these potential confounding factors.
6.2 Alternative measures of bank exposure to capital flows
We experiment with two other measures of the shock to banks’ balance sheet induced by
the surge in foreign capital inflows. The first is a shift-share Bartik instrument combining
(i) the bank composition of foreign liabilities by sourcing country before the shock with
(ii) data on changes in capital outflows from those countries to the rest of the world after
the shock. We focus on the top 15 sourcing countries that account for more than 90% of
foreign liabilities, and we measure their change in capital outflows towards the rest of
the world (excluding Italy) between the period 1998-2001 and 2002-2007. As an illustra-
tive example, Figure A1 in the Appendix plots the patterns of foreign claims of banks
in Germany and Luxembourg. These were similar in the 1980s and in the 1990s but di-
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verged starting in 2002, when cross-border lending from Germany sharply increased. The
new bank-level exposure indicator would then capture that Italian banks borrowing from
Germany before 2002 are disproportionally more exposed to financial flows than banks
borrowing from Luxembourg.22 Table 16 shows that our core results on misallocation are
unaffected using this alternative exposure measure.
The second measure aims at isolating the supply side component of capital flows and
exploit the time-series dimension of the data. We first project the log-change of Italian
banks’ foreign liabilities on their world counterpart over the 1998-2007 period, as in Cesa-
Bianchi et al. (2018), using BIS data on changes of outstanding cross-border liabilities:





where KF ITt are the outstanding foreign liabilities of the Italian banking sector in year t
and KFWorldt are the foreign outstanding liabilities of the other countries in the world, ex-
cluding Italy. If country-specific pull shocks to Italy do not affect world capital flows, the
fitted values λ̂1∆ lnKFWorldt can be interpreted as the supply side component of capital








where the strength of credit supply shocks is obtained comparing the patterns of lending
by banks with different exposure induced by yearly changes in push determinants of
foreign capital flows. The results in Table 17 confirm that while exposed banks increase
credit supply as global flows gain strength, the allocation of such credit is not consistent
with an increase in misallocation.
22Here bank exposure is computed as: ExposureGeob =
∑
c ωbc ∆World Outflows
post−pre
c , where ωbc is
the share of foreign liability that bank b sources from country c in 1998-2000, and ∆World Outflowspost−prec
is the increase in lending of country c to the rest of the world.
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6.3 Additional and time-varying firm level characteristics
We extend our analysis looking at alternative definitions of firm productivity and credit
constraint. First, we focus on firms’ credit rating, an index computed by CERVED as an
Altman score that accounts, among other things, for firms’ profitability, assets, and credit
history. The credit score takes values between 1 and 9; firms with a credit score above 6
are considered to have a high risk of default (Rodano et al., 2018). The first two columns
of Table 18 show that our core findings on misallocation are unaltered if grouping firms
based on productivity and the credit score. In particular, high productivity but risky firms
benefitted from the increase in lending by exposed banks as much as low-productivity but
low-risk firms, irrespective of the productivity measure. Then, in the third column, we
look at value added per worker as an alternative measure of productivity and we can
confirm the previous results of the paper.
The firm-level measures of productivity and credit constraint are defined according to
ex-ante characteristics, but we check the robustness of results to allowing them to vary.
For example, due to firms’ life cycle or to idiosyncratic shock, some ex-ante high pro-
ductivity firm might become unproductive, and viceversa. The time-varying measures
of firm productivity and credit constraint are taken at t − 1, so that the the grouping of
firms can vary year by year. Because firm characteristics might also vary in response to
credit supply allocation, the results can only be taken as indicative, but they confirm our
baseline findings (Table 19).23
6.4 Potential spillovers across banks
The possibility of spillovers from exposed to non-exposed banks is a relevant threat to our
identification strategy. Non-exposed banks could in principle benefit from international
capital inflows indirectly through interbank linkages or through market effects, such as
bond or equity purchases. Moreover, exposed banks may change their retail policy, by
either focusing less on, or bidding more aggressively for deposits. In all these cases,
capital inflows would end up affecting the funds available to non-exposed banks. We
23An alternative way to look at the same issue is to define firms’ characteristics as an average of the
ex-post years and our results hold using also that approach, see Table A4 in the Appendix.
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therefore check for the relevance of these indirect effects.
In principle, interbank lending is of particular concern for identification, as transac-
tions grew disproportionately in Italy around the same time as the surge in capital in-
flows. In practice, however, we do not expect spillovers through that market to be a
relevant confounding factor in our case. The reason is that the upward trend in interbank
transaction was driven by intra-group lending, that is loans between banks belonging to
the same banking group (Figure 6). As explained in Section 3 our analysis refers to bank-
ing groups so that intra-group lending is consolidated in the data. As the figure shows,
lending across groups, and therefore exposed vs non exposed banks, remains flat over the
period. We test for this more formally by running the following specification at the bank
level:
Ybt = β1 Expb × Postt +X
′
bδ × Postt + γb + αt + εbt (11)
where Ybt is alternatively i) interbank lending of bank b in year t; ii) holding of bonds and
equity of financial institutions; iii) share of deposit on banks’ liabilities; iv) bank’s b share
of the total deposit taking in the economy. The coefficient β1 captures how these variables
change after 2002 for banks more exposed to capital inflows, controlling for our standard
vector of bank characteristics pre-2002, banks fixed effects, and year dummies; errors are
clustered at the bank level.
The results, reported in table 20, show that bank exposure is uncorrelated with bonds
or equity holdings, as well as with the share of deposits. Moreover, interbank lending by
exposed banks slightly decreased after 2002. These results imply that potential indirect
effects of capital inflows are unlikely to weaken the results on misallocation discussed in
Section 4.2.
6.5 Fragility of exposed banks after the global financial crisis
Our baseline analysis focuses on the boom in capital inflows during the run up to the
global financial crisis. In 2008 the Italian economy suffered the consequences of the Great
recession, which was followed by a second severe downturn in 2011 with the sovereign
debt crisis erupted; as a result, its banking system experienced a disproportionate increase
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in non-performing loans (NPLs).
In this context, it is relevant to ask whether reliance on foreign funds made banks more
vulnerable, implying a higher incidence of NPLs during the following double-dip reces-
sion. The global financial crisis also implied a reversal of international financial flows,
which begs the questions whether borrowers of exposed banks were made more vulner-
able by a credit contraction.
We check for these possibilities extending our time window to 2013, and evaluating
the differential impact of bank exposure across three subperiods (1998-2001; 2002-2007;
2008-2013).24 We focus on i) the effect of exposure on the patterns of NPL ratios at the
bank-level, and ii) the effects on the intensive margin of credit supply in the bank-firm
level regressions.
Our findings in Table 21 suggest that the higher credit supply of exposed banks during
the boom of capital inflows did not imply a higher incidence of loans in or near default
in the subsequent years (columns 1 and 2). Moreover, we find no evidence of a decline in
credit supply from exposed banks in the post-2008 period (columns 3 an 4).
The many concurring shocks to banks’ and firms’ financial conditions during the crisis
and double dip recession period, however, suggest the results of this analysis should be
interpreted with caution.
7 Concluding remarks: remaining puzzles and further re-
search
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that is able to link international finan-
cial flows to misallocation, by focusing on the bank lending channel. Looking at the boom
of cross-border flows of the early 2000s, we find that increased capital flows did not lead
to higher misallocation nor lowered aggregate productivity in Italy. These findings are
somehow unexpected and leave open the question of what explains the rise of misalloca-
tion in Italy and, possibly, other Southern European countries. We discuss a few potential
24We consolidate the data based on groups’ composition in 2013 and we recompute all bank-specific
variables accordingly.
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avenues for future research seeking to investigate further the impact of cross-border flows
on productivity.
For one thing, international financial flows may distort resource allocation not through
the bank lending channel but through the government, or households. In Italy, govern-
ment borrowing accounted for a small, but non-negligible, fraction of the decrease of the
net international investment position (around 20% of the total decline). To the extent
that these funds induced an increase of e.g. public procurement, the government channel
could explain part of the raise of misallocation in Italy. Similarly, capital inflows could
trigger a reallocation of households’ investments towards less productive firms or to-
wards banks that then increase credit to firms with lower productivity. These alternative
channels deserve further investigation.
Second, capital inflows may have different consequences when driven by domestic
pull-factors rather than by push-factors external to the country, as was largely the case
for Italy. Establishing whether such difference exists would be important in terms of pol-
icy implications. If international financial flows distort resource allocation when driven
by global factors, then capital controls should be called for to mitigate this negative ef-
fect. However, if capital flows have a negative effect only when driven by domestic pull-
factors, then macro-prudential tools would be more appropriate.
Third, our findings suggest that the liability structure of banks may matter for credit
allocation and aggregate productivity. International financial flows seem to have a dis-
ciplining effect on credit allocation that traditional deposits may not have. This could
be associated to the higher rollover risk that characterizes international interbank lend-
ing, but it can reflect also stronger monitoring, as most foreign funding is unsecured.
This poses the question of whether the funding structure of banks matters for a country’s
productivity and, more generally, to what extent credit intermediation can account for
the observed trends of aggregate misallocation. Hopefully, the findings of the paper can
stimulate further research along these dimensions.
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Source: BIS. Foreign liabilities (claims) of Italian banks are defined by taking the total cross-border claims
(liabilities) of all countries and all sectors to Italian banks (nominal USD).
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(b) With bank characteristics
For each bank we look at the average share of capital flows that it received relative to the overall flows
in the economy in the post-2002 period (vertical axis) and at the average foreign liabilities ratio - foreign
liabilities relative to overall liabilities - pre-2002 (horizontal axis). In Panel A we look at the unconditional
correlation between the two variables and in Panel B we control for bank characteristics such as log-assets,
share of non-core liabilities, share of NPLs, and capital share (pre-2002 average).
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Figure 3: Shock to foreign claims on selected Euro area countries.
Source: Amiti et al. (2017). Year-on-year growth in foreign claims of all reporting internationally active
banks on the country listed in the panel title, adjusted for breaks in series and exchange rate movements.
2: Estimated demand shocks to unique to the borrower country listed in the panel title. 3: Estimated net
supply shocks to the constellation of banking systems that have outstanding foreign claims on the borrower
country listed in the panel title. 4: Estimated shocks that are common to all banking systems and borrower
countries.
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The Figure reports the coefficients βq , with 99% confidence interval, of the dynamic diff-in-diff in the fol-









bδq × 1t=q + αit + γib + εibt.
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Figure 6: Interbank lending across and within groups
The Figure reports the evolution of the interbank lending at monthly frequency between 1998 and 2007
across and within banking groups. It shows that interbank lending raised mainly within banking groups
and not much across groups.
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Tables
Table 1: High Foreign Liability Ratio Predicts Exposure to Capital Inflows
(1) (2) (3)
Share of total Growth of foreign Rank foreign liability
inflows (02-07) liabilities (post vs. pre) ratio (02-07)
Foreign liability ratio (98-00) 0.54*** 0.51***
(0.03) (0.04)
Rank foreign liability ratio (98-00) 0.75***
(0.03)
Bank Controls ! ! !
Observations 494 494 494
Adj.R2 0.80 0.63 0.71
Note: Cross-sectional bank-level regressions. Column 1 reports the elasticity of the average share of the ag-




the foreign liability ratio of the bank measured 1998-2000 (ForeignLiab98−00b /TotLiab
98−00
b ). Column 2 reports
the elasticity of the growth in foreign funding (pre-vs.post) relative to the total liabilities in the pre-period
(∆ForeignLiabb/TotLiab
98−00





umn 3 regress the ranking of banks by the foreign liability ratio in the 2002-07 period relative to the ranking in
1998-2000. All regressions include bank controls measured in the 1998-2000 period such as log-assets, NPL ratio,
capital ration and core funding ratio. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. ***significant at the 1% level,
** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2: Balancing tests
High exposed Banks Low exposed banks Normalized
Unit Mean Mean difference
Bank characteristics
Total Assets eMillions 5,780 1,800 0.23
Nonperforming Loans % Assets 2.4 3.4 -0.25
Domestic interbank % Liability 8 13.1 0.21
Core capital %Liabilities 3.7 3.9 0.007
Borrower characteristics
Fixed Assets eThousands 2,990 1,095 0.02
Gross operating margin % Revenues 8.4 8.7 -0.04
Credit Score Units 5.3 5.4 0.04
Productivity log-TFPR 5.2 4.9 0.12
Age years 15 13 0.19
Note: The table reports relevant balance sheet characteristics of banks and of their average borrower
(1998-2000 average), dividing the sample between high- and low-exposed banks. High-exposed
(low-exposed) banks have a share of foreign liabilities above (below) 10% over the period 1998-2000.
The last column shows the normalized difference between the two groups as specified in Imbens and
Wooldridge (2008); an absolute value above 0.25 indicates an imbalance between the two groups.
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Table 3: Summary statistics
Unit Mean S.D. p25 p50 p75
Bank characteristics
Total Assets eMillions 3,230 27,800 79 176 442
Liquid Assets % Assets 3,605 5,230 626 1,473 3,841
Nonperforming Loans % Assets 2.6 3.3 0.8 1.7 3.3
Core capital % Assets 1.8 8.2 0.01 0.2 1.5
Core Funding % Liabilities 54.5 19.1 45 54 68
Foreign Funding % Liabilities 3.7 13.1 0.003 0.01 0.06
Firm characteristics
Bank Credit eThousands 1,642 15,700 155 395 1083
Revenues eThousands 4,173 5,673 743 1,751 4,708
Fixed Assets eThousands 2,327 72,301 70 240 819
Gross operating margin % Revenues 6 52 3.3 7.6 13
Credit Score Units 5.2 1.9 4 5 7
Note: The table reports relevant statistics (1998-2007, average) of banks and firms
in the firm-bank matched sample. Bank balance sheet data are from the Super-
visory Reports submitted by banks to the Bank of Italy. Credit data are from the
Italian Credit Register. Firm balance sheet data are from CERVED. Liquid assets in-
clude cash, interbank deposits, and bond holdings. Core funding refers to deposits.
Firms’ credit score is computed by CERVED based on past defaults and firms’ bal-
ance sheet information.
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Table 4: Baseline results on credit: intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Continuous Dummy 10% Dummy 15% Exposure above 2% WLS
Exposureb × Postt 0.40*** 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.40*** 0.40***
(0.06) (0.004) (0.004) (0.05) (0.06)
Specbst 0.235*** 0.234*** 0.234*** 0.185*** 0.25***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Firm-time F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Firm-bank F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Bank Controls ! ! ! ! !
Observations 4,141,748 4,141,748 4,141,748 3,407,129 4,110,749
Adj.R2 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 1. The dependent variable,
lnCibt, is the log of outstanding credit between bank b and firm i in year t. The variable Exposureb captures
bank exposure to foreign capital flows, defined as the foreign liability ratio over the period 1998-2000. Specbst
is a dummy that captures if a firm operates in a sector in which the bank specializes its lending activities. Bank
controls include bank characteristics measure in 1998-2000 interacted with a post-2002 dummy, these are log-
assets, share of NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the capital ratio. All regressions include firm-year fixed effects
and firm-bank dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-sector (2-digit) level. ***significant at the
1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
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Table 5: Extensive margin of credit
Exit Entry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continuous Dummy 15% Continuous Dummy 15%
Exposureb -0.11*** -0.009*** 0.19*** 0.03***
(0.024) (0.002) (0.03) (0.004)
Firm-period F.E. ! ! ! !
Bank F.E. ! ! ! !
Bank Controls ! ! ! !
Specialization ! ! ! !
Observations 1,030,013 1,030,013 1,030,013 1,030,013
Adj.R2 0.55 0.55 0.45 0.48
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the extensive margin specification in Equa-
tion 2. We split the sample by sector. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes
the value of 1 if firm i starts (entry) or ends (exit) a credit relation with bank b after
2002. The variable Exposureb captures bank exposure to foreign capital flows, defined
as the foreign liability ratio over the period 1998-2000. Other bank controls include
bank characteristics measured in 1998-2000 interacted with a post-2002 dummy, these
are log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the capital ratio. Specialization
is a dummy that captures if a firm operates in a sector in which the bank specializes its
lending activities. All regressions include firm-period fixed effects and bank dummies.
Standard errors are clustered at the bank-sector (2-digit) level. ***significant at the 1%
level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
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Table 6: Aggregate results on credit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Continuous Dummy 10% Dummy 15% Exposure above 2% WLS
Exposurei × Postt 0.24*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.40*** 0.216***
(0.06) (0.006) (0.005) (0.05) (0.04)
Estimated firm-time F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Firm F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Sector-time F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Bank Controls ! ! ! ! !
Observations 4,141,748 4,141,748 4,141,748 3,407,129 4,110,749
Adj.R2 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 4. The dependent variable, lnCit, is
the log of outstanding credit of firm i in year t. The variableExposurei is the weighted average of exposure to foreign
capital inflows of firm’s i lenders in the period 1998-2000, as defined in Equation 3. Bank controls are a weighted
average of firm’s i lenders’ characteristics measured in 1998-2000, interacted with a post-2002 dummy, these are
log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the capital ratio. All regressions include sector-year fixed effects
and firm dummies, and the firm-time fixed effects computed in the intensive margin regression. Standard errors are
bootstrapped with clusters at the sector-main bank level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level,
* significant at the 10% level.
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Table 7: Misallocation by industry, intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Manufacturing Construction Trade Service Other
Expb × Postt 0.57*** 0.14 0.18 0.34***
(0.06) (0.19) (0.16) (0.10)
Firm-time F.E. ! ! ! !
Firm-bank F.E. ! ! ! !
Bank Controls ! ! ! !
Specialization ! ! ! !
Observations 1,922,581 427,477 1,101,423 690,267
Adj.R2 0.90 0.87 0.91 0.91
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation
1, where we divide the sample by firms’ macro sectors. The dependent variable,
lnCibt, is the log of outstanding credit between bank b and firm i in year t. The vari-
able Exposureb captures bank exposure to foreign capital flows, defined as the for-
eign liability ratio over the period 1998-2000. Bank controls include bank character-
istics measure in 1998-2000 interacted with a post-2002 dummy, these are log-assets,
share of NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the capital ratio. Specialization is a dummy
that captures if a firm operates in a sector in which the bank specializes its lending
activities. All regressions include firm-year fixed effects and firm-bank dummies.
Standard errors are clustered at the bank-sector (2-digit) level. ***significant at the
1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level
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Table 8: Misallocation by industry, extensive margin
Entry Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Manuf. Constr. Trade Service Other Manuf. Constr. Trade Service Other
Exposureb 0.0548* -0.0793 0.0321 -0.0191 -0.260*** -0.134** -0.190*** -0.188***
(0.0322) (0.108) (0.0865) (0.0330) (0.0252) (0.0592) (0.0471) (0.0308)
Firm-period F.E. ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Bank F.E. ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Bank Controls ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Specialization ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Observations 358,591 115,188 234,597 188,242 358,591 115,188 234,597 188,242
Adj.R2 0.337 0.316 0.328 0.328 0.340 0.354 0.345 0.357
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the extensive margin specification in Equation 2, where we divide the
sample by firms’ macro sectors. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if firm i starts (entry) or
ends (exit) a credit relation with bank b after 2002. The variable Exposureb captures bank exposure to foreign capital
flows, defined as the foreign liability ratio over the period 1998-2000. Bank controls include bank characteristics
measured in 1998-2000 interacted with a post-2002 dummy, these are log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding ratio,
and the capital ratio. Specialization is a dummy that captures if a firm operates in a sector in which the bank
specializes its lending activities. All regressions include firm-period fixed effects and bank dummies. Standard
errors are clustered at the bank-sector (2-digit) level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *
significant at the 10% level.
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Table 9: Misallocation by industry, aggregate effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Manufacturing Construction Trade Service Other
Expb × Postt 0.24*** 0.11 0.05 0.42***
(0.07) (0.15) (0.09) (0.11)
Estimated firm-time F.E. ! ! ! !
Firm F.E. ! ! ! !
Sector-time F.E. ! ! ! !
Bank Controls ! ! ! !
Observations 504,261 129,812 317,217 218,134
Adj.R2 0.90 0.87 0.91 0.91
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 1, where we
divide the sample by firms’ macro sectors. The dependent variable, lnCit, is the log of out-
standing credit of firm i in year t. The variable Exposurei is the weighted average of exposure
to foreign capital inflows of firm’s i lenders in the period 1998-2000 as defined in Equation
3. Bank controls are a weighted average of firm’s i lenders’ characteristics measured in 1998-
2000, interacted with a post-2002 dummy, these are log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding
ratio, and the capital ratio. All regressions include sector-year fixed effects and firm dummies,
and the firm-time fixed effects computed in the intensive margin regression. Standard errors
are bootstrapped with clusters at the sector-main bank level. ***significant at the 1% level, **
significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. .
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Table 10: Misallocation by firms’ characteristics, intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MRPK TFPR Collateral MRPK / TFPR /
Exposureb ∗ Postt∗: (fixed assets) collateral collateral
High 0.436*** 0.460*** 0.448***
(0.077) (0.067) (0.065)










Firm-time F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Firm-bank F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Bank Controls ! ! ! ! !
Specialization ! ! ! ! !
Observations 2,689,020 3,183,909 3,183,909 2,689,020 3,183,909
Adj.R2 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the specification in Equation 5. The dependent
variable, lnCibt, is the log of outstanding credit between bank b and firm i in year t. We show
the results of bank exposure to foreign capital flows by firm types, where firms are divided
along a productivity dimension (above and below the sectoral average) and credit constraint
(fixed assets above and below the sectoral average). The variable Exposureb captures bank
exposure to foreign capital flows, defined as the foreign liability ratio over the period 1998-
2000. Bank controls include bank characteristics measured in 1998-2000 interacted with a
post-2002 dummy, these are log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the capital
ratio. Specialization is a dummy that captures if a firm operates in a sector in which the bank
specializes its lending activities. All regressions include firm-year fixed effects and firm-bank
dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-sector (2-digit) level. ***significant at the
1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
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Table 11: Misallocation by firms’ characteristics, extensive margin
Exit Entry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MRPK Collateral MRPK MRPK Collateral MRPK.
Exposureb ∗ Postt∗: (fixed assets) & collateral (fixed assets) & collateral
High -0.14*** -0.162*** 0.221*** 0.125***
(0.028) (0.030) (0.035) (0.029)
Low -0.070*** 0.026 0.162*** 0.365***









Firm-period F.E. ! ! ! ! ! !
Bank F.E. ! ! ! ! ! !
Bank Controls ! ! ! ! ! !
Specialization ! ! ! ! ! !
Observations 766,654 841,324 766,654 766,654 841,324 766,654
Adj.R2 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.45 0.46 0.46
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the specification on misallocation on the extensive margin in the context
of specification in Equation 2. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if firm i starts (entry) or
ends (exit) a credit relation with bank b after 2002. We show the results of bank exposure to foreign capital flows by
firm types, where firms are divided along a productivity dimension (above and below the sectoral average) and
credit constraint (fixed assets above and below the sectoral average). Bank controls include bank characteristics
measured in 1998-2000 interacted with a post-2002 dummy, these are log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding
ratio, and the capital ratio. Specialization is a dummy that captures if a firm operates in a sector in which the bank
specializes its lending activities. All regressions include firm-period fixed effects and bank dummies. Standard
errors are clustered at the bank-sector (2-digit) level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *
significant at the 10% level.
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Table 12: Misallocation by firms’ characteristics, aggregate credit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MRPK TFPR Collateral MRPK / TFPR /
Exposurei ∗ Postt∗: (fixed assets) collateral collateral
High 0.346*** 0.293*** 0.311***
(0.068) (0.061) (0.062)










Est. Firm-time F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Firm F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Sector-time F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Bank Controls ! ! ! ! !
Observations 743,522 886,227 886,227 743,522 886,227
Adj.R2 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the specification on misallocation on aggregate
credit. The dependent variable, lnCit, is the log of outstanding credit of firm i in year t.
We show the results of firm exposure to foreign capital flows according to the exposure
of the banks they are borrowing from, as defined in Equation 3. Firms are divided along
a productivity dimension (above and below the sectoral average) and credit constraint
(fixed assets above and below the sectoral average). Bank controls include bank charac-
teristics pre-2001 interacted with a post-2001 dummy, these are log-assets, share of NPLs,
core-funding ratio, and the capital ratio. All regressions include sector-year fixed effects
and firm dummies, and the firm-time fixed effects estimated in the intensive margin re-
gression. Standard errors are bootstrapped with clusters at the sector-main bank level.
***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
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Table 13: Bank exposure and household lending
(1) (2) (3)
Continuos Dummy 10% Dummy 15%
Exposureb × Postt 0.086 -0.043* -0.013
(0.068) (0.024) (0.021)
Province-Year F.E.. ! ! !
Province-BankF.E. ! ! !
Bank Controls ! ! !
Observations 128,904 128,904 128,904
Adj.R2 0.97 0.97 0.97
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the specification in Equation 6.
The dependent is household lending. The variable Exposureb captures
bank exposure to foreign capital flows, defined as the foreign liability ra-
tio over the period 1998-2000. Bank controls include bank characteristics
pre-2001 interacted with the post-dummies, these are log-assets, share of
NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the capital ratio. All regressions include
province-year fixed effects, bank-province fixed effects and bank con-
trols. Standard errors are clustered at the province level. ***significant at
the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
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Table 14: MRPK and firm level exposure
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample High MRPK-pre Low MRPK-pre
Exposurei ∗ Postt -0.20 -0.69** -0.01
(.16) (0.33) (0.09)
Firm F.E. ! ! !
Sector-time F.E. ! ! !
Bank Controls ! ! !
Observations 683,136 357,865 325,271
Adj.R2 0.72 0.73 0.41
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the specification lnMRPKist =
β1 Exposure F irmi×Postt+γi+δst+εist. The dependent variable, lnMRPKit,
is the log of the marginal product of firm i in year t. The variable Exposurei is
the weighted average of exposure to foreign capital inflows of firm’s i lenders in
the period 1998-2000, as defined in Equation 3. Bank controls include bank char-
acteristics pre-2001 interacted with a post-2001 dummy, these are log-assets,
share of NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the capital ratio. All regressions include
sector-year fixed effects and firm dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the
sector-main bank level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5%
level, * significant at the 10% level.
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Table 15: Baseline robustness
Dependent variable: lnCreditibt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Securitization Recession China All
Exposureb × Postt 0.40*** 0.383*** 0.424*** 0.397*** 0.411***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Securitization Shareb × Postt -2.02*** -1.8***
(0.30) (0.32)
Recession Shareb × Postt -0.427*** -0.379***
(0.07) (0.12)
China Shareb × Postt -0.142*** -0.04
(0.03) (0.11)
Firm-time F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Firm-bank F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Bank Controls ! ! ! ! !
Specialization ! ! ! ! !
Observations 4,141,748 4,059,984 4,059,984 4,059,984 4,059,984
Adj.R2 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 1. The dependent variable,
lnCibt, is the log of outstanding credit between bank b and firm i in year t. The variableExposureb captures
bank exposure to foreign capital flows, defined as the foreign liability ratio over the period 1998-2000. Bank
controls include bank characteristics measured in 1998-2000 interacted with a post-2002 dummy, these are
log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the capital ratio. All regressions include firm-year fixed
effects and firm-bank dummies. Specialization is a dummy that captures if a firm operates in a sector in
which the bank specializes its lending activities. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-sector (2-digit)
level. Column 1 reports the baseline results; column 2 controls for the share of securitized loans that banks
made in 2001; column 3 controls for the share of loans in 1998-2000 to sectors that experienced a recession
in 2001-02; column 4 controls for the share of loans in 1998-2000 to sectors that turned out to be more
exposed to competition from China after its access in the WTO; column 5 have all the robustness controls
at the same time. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
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Table 16: Misallocation by firms’ characteristics, with alternative measure of bank shock,
intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MRPK TFPR Collateral MRPK / TFPR /
ExposureGeob ∗ Postt∗: (fixed assets) collateral collateral
High 0.151*** 0.142*** 0.135***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)










Firm-time F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Firm-bank F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Bank Controls ! ! ! ! !
Specialization ! ! ! ! !
Observations 2,689,020 3,183,909 3,183,909 2,689,020 3,183,909
Adj.R2 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the specification in Equation 5 with the addition of
bank-time fixed effects. The dependent variable, lnCibt, is the log of outstanding credit be-
tween bank b and firm i in year t. We show the results of bank exposure to foreign capital flows
by firm types, where firms are divided along a productivity dimension (above and below the
sectoral average) and credit constraint (fixed assets above and below the sectoral average), the
Low-Productivity and Low-Collateral are the excluded categories. Bank exposure is defined
as ExposureGeob =
∑
c ωbc ∆World Outflows
post−pre
c , where ∆World Outflowspost−prec is the
change of outstanding claims of the banks of country c towards the rest of the world, excluding
Italy, in the period before and after 2002; ωbc is the share of inflows of bank b from country c in
the 1998-2000 period. Bank controls include bank characteristics measured in 1998-2000 inter-
acted with a post-2002 dummy, these are log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the
capital ratio. Specialization is a dummy that captures if a firm operates in a sector in which the
bank specializes its lending activities. All regressions include firm-year fixed effects and firm-
bank dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-sector (2-digit) level. ***significant at
the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
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Table 17: Misallocation by firms’ characteristics, intensive margin, alternative measure of
bank exposure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MRPK TFPR Collateral MRPK / TFPR /
Exposureb ∗ λ̂1∆ lnKFWorldt : (fixed assets) collateral collateral
High 0.400*** 0.416*** 0.393***
(.020) (0.017) (0.017)










Firm-time F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Firm-bank F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Bank Controls ! ! ! ! !
Specialization ! ! ! ! !
Observations 2,689,020 3,183,909 3,183,909 2,689,020 3,183,909
Adj.R2 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the specification in Equation 10. The dependent variable,
lnCibt, is the log of outstanding credit between bank b and firm i in year t. We show the results of
bank exposure to foreign capital flows by firm types, where firms are divided along a productivity
dimension (above and below the sectoral average) and credit constraint (fixed assets above and below
the sectoral average). The variableExposureb os the foreign liability ratio over the period 1998-2000 and
it is interacted with a measure of capital inflows to Italy in year t driven by push-factors, as estimated
in Equation 9. Bank controls include bank characteristics measured in 1998-2000 interacted with a post-
2002 dummy, these are log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the capital ratio. Specialization
is a dummy that captures if a firm operates in a sector in which the bank specializes its lending activities.
All regressions include firm-year fixed effects and firm-bank dummies. Standard errors are clustered at
the bank-sector (2-digit) level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant
at the 10% level.
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Table 18: Misallocation by alternative firms’ characteristics
Intensive margin
(1) (2) (3)
Prod = MRPK Prod = TFPR Prod = Labor prod.
Exposurei ∗ Postt∗: Risk = Credit score Risk = Credit score Risk = Credit constr.
HProd - LRisk 0.51*** 0.482*** 0.513***
(0.06) (0.067) (0.07)
LProd - LRisk 0.38*** 0.299*** 0.279***
(0.06) (0.067) (0.063)
HProd - HRisk 0.35*** 0.285*** 0.299***
(0.09) (0.086) (0.09)
LProd - HRisk 0.066 0.088 0.079
(0.09) (0.07) (0.091)
Firm-time F.E. ! ! !
Firm-bank F.E. ! ! !
Bank Control ! ! !
Specialization ! ! !
Observations 2,689,020 3,183,909 3,151,375
Adj.R2 0.90 0.90 0.90
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the specification in Equation 5. The dependent variable,
lnCibt, is the log of outstanding credit between bank b and firm i in year t. We show the results
of bank exposure to foreign capital flows by firm types, where firms are divided along a produc-
tivity dimension - looking at MRPK (column 1), TFPR (column 2) and value added per worker
(column 3) - as well as a risk dimension - taking credit score (columns 1 and 2) and fixed assets
(column 3, low risk meaning high fixed assets). The variable Exposureb captures bank exposure
to foreign capital flows, defined as the foreign liability ratio over the period 1998-2000. Bank
controls include bank characteristics measured in 1998-2000 interacted with a post-2002 dummy,
these are log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the capital ratio. All regressions in-
clude firm-year fixed effects and firm-bank dummies. Specialization is a dummy that captures if
a firm operates in a sector in which the bank specializes its lending activities. Standard errors are
clustered at the bank-sector (2-digit) level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5%
level, * significant at the 10% level.
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Table 19: Misallocation by lagged firms’ characteristics, intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MRPK TFPR Collateral MRPK / TFPR /
Exposureb ∗ Postt∗: (fixed assets) collateral collateral
Hight−1 0.492*** 0.496*** 0.462***
(.064) (0.068) (0.065)










Firm-time F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Firm-bank F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Bank Controls ! ! ! ! !
Specialization ! ! ! ! !
Observations 2,585,734 3,016,942 3,016,942 2,585,734 3,016,942
Adj.R2 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90






bδ×Postt+αit+γib+εibt. The dependent variable, lnCibt, is
the log of outstanding credit between bank b and firm i in year t. We show the results of bank
exposure to foreign capital flows by firm types, where, for each t − 1 year, firms are divided
along a productivity dimension (above and below the sectoral average) and credit constraint
(fixed assets above and below the sectoral average). The variable Exposureb captures bank
exposure to foreign capital flows, defined as the foreign liability ratio over the period 1998-
2000. Bank controls include bank characteristics measured in 1998-2000 interacted with a
post-2002 dummy, these are log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the capital ra-
tio. Specialization is a dummy that captures if a firm operates in a sector in which the bank
specializes its lending activities. All regressions include firm-year fixed effects and firm-bank
dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-sector (2-digit) level. ***significant at the
1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
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Table 20: Spillover effects, a balance sheet analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Interbank lending Bonds & equity holdings Deposits Share of deposits
Expb × Postt -1.92*** -0.36 0.21 -0.0003
(0.45) (1.07) (0.40) (0.0003)
Bank controls ! ! ! !
Bank F.E. ! ! ! !
Time F.E. ! ! ! !
Observations 5,326 5,167 5,552 5,720
Adj.R2 0.90 0.90 0.93 0.99
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 11. The depen-
dent variable is the log of domestic interbank-lending (column 1); the log of bonds and equity
holdings of other financial institutions (column 2); the log of deposits (column 3); and the share
of the total deposit in the economy (column 4). The variable Exposureb captures bank exposure
to foreign capital flows, defined as the foreign liability ratio over the period 1998-2000. Bank
controls include bank characteristics measured in 1998-2000 interacted with a post-2002 dummy.
All regressions include bank fixed effects and year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the
bank level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10%
level.
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Table 21: Bank exposure and post-2008 fragility
Bank level regression Bank-firm level regression
Dependent variable NPL ratio Credit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continuos Dummy 15% Continuos Dummy 15%
Exposureb × Post2002t 0.02 -0.001 0.23*** 0.05***
(0.02) (0.004) (0.06) (0.004)
Exposureb × Post2008t 0.03 0.008 0.25*** 0.04***
(0.02) (0.012) (0.05) (0.007)
Bank F.E. ! !
Year F.E. ! !
Firm-time F.E. ! !
Firm-bank F.E. ! !
Specialization ! !
Bank Controls ! ! ! !
Observations 5,846 5,846 7,494,518 7,494,518
Adj.R2 0.62 0.62 0.84 0.84
Note: In columns 1 and 2 we report the results of the bank level regressionNPLRatiobt =
β1 Exposureb×Post2002−07t +β2 Expb×Post2008−13t +X
′
bδ×Postt+γb+αt+εbt. In columns
3 and 4 we report the results of the bank-firm level regression lnCibt = β1 Exposureb ×







Post2008−13t + αit + γib + εibt. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level (columns 1
and 2) and at the bank-sector (2-digit) level (columns 3 and 4). ***significant at the 1%
level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
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Appendix
A.1 The Hsieh-Klenow framework to compute aggregate TFP gains
In Hsieh and Klenow (2009) misallocation and inefficiency are defined relative to a world
where there are no frictions in product and factors markets, so that the value of the
marginal product of each factor is equalized across firms. This is an equilibrium because
firms have no incentive to change their production decisions. Moreover, it is a stable
equilibrium as any exogenous shock that creates dispersion in factors’ marginal prod-
uct across firms would trigger a reallocation of that factor until its remuneration is again
equalized across firms.
They use a standard model of monopolistic competition with heterogenous firms with
different TFPQ levels Ai. Each firm combines capital and labor to produce a single good
using a Cobb-Douglas technology. All firms face the same factor prices, but they are sub-
ject to firm-specific distortions. They assume that there are two types of distortions, one
that affects output, which works like a tax or a subsidy, and another factor specific distor-
tion that affects firms’ capital-labor ratio. In this setting firm i’s revenue-based productiv-
ity (TFPRi) is proportional to the weighted geometric average of the marginal revenue
product of capital and labor (MRPKi and MRPLi), which in turn are proportional to the
firm’s distortions:
TFPRi ∝ (MRPKi)α(MRPLi)1−α ∝
(1 + τKi )
α
(1− τYi )
This implies that the cross-firm variability of TFPRi is not influenced by firm-level char-
acteristics other than the distortions, so that the extent of misallocation can be studied by
looking at the dispersion of the TFPRi distribution. Moreover, HK show that, assuming
that TFPR and TFPQ are jointly log-normally distributed, the dispersion of TFPRi maps












where σ is the elasticity of substitution across porducts. As this Equation highlights, a
larger dispersion of TFPRi leads to lower aggregate productivity. We use this formula
to provide some estimate of the impact of foreign capital flows on misallocation. We
assume that the credit that more exposed firms get affects only firms’ wedges and not their
physical productivity Asi. The idea is that firm-specific financial constraints are part of
the distortions that firms face and that a higher supply of credit relaxes such constraints.
Therefore, we estimate the impact of firms’ exposure to treated banks on TFPRi using a
specification similar to regression 4 and we compute the variance of the predicted TFPRi
resulting from the bank-lending channel. In this way, we can compute the aggregate TFP
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gain/loss induced by capital inflows as:25
lnTFP Gain = ̂lnTFP − lnTFP = σ
2
[var( ̂lnTFPRi)− var(lnTFPRi)]
A.2 The Sraer-Thesmar approach to compute aggregate TFP gains
Sraer and Thesmar (2018) set up a steady-state general equilibrium model with hetero-
geneous firms that face stochastic productivity shocks and are subject to distortions such
as adjustment costs, taxes, and financial frictions. They do not solve for the the model
explicitly, but they derive sufficient statistics formulas that allow to aggregate the effects
of firms’ treatment. They provide conditions under which the estimated treatment effects
on the joint ergodic distribution of output to MRPK and TFPR are independent of gen-
eral equilibrium conditions, which allows to aggregate the treatment effects estimated in
partial equilibrium.
These conditions relate on two key assumptions about technology and frictions. First,
a change in general equilibrium, which affects firm size, will not affect distortions. This
means that the sources of distortions are assumed to be homogeneous of degree one, so
that frictions remain on average constant on a size-adjusted basis. Second, firm-level pro-
duction technology is Cobb-Douglas, with either constant or decreasing returns to scale.
They argue that these assumptions, even if could appear restrictive, are largely satisfied
in the macro-finance literature. Moreover, they show that these conditions are valid also
in the presence of persistent difference in productivity across firms, with heterogeneous
treatment effects, and under alternative industry structures.
They obtain a formula for changes in steady-state aggregate TFP (and output) that
combine parameters of the model (labor share, the elasticity of substitution of goods
within an industry, labor supply elasticity) and three sufficient statistics that characterize
the joint distribution of TFPR and MRPK. The first statistic is the effect of firm treatment
on the average log MRPK, which measures the effect of firm exposure on the credit avail-
able to firms. The second statistic is the treatment effect on the variance of the log MRPK,
which measures the effect of treatment on the allocation of capital across firms. The fi-
nal statistic is the effect on the covariance of the log MRPK and log TFPR; if treatment
reduces this covariance, it makes productive firms relatively less distorted, which favors
aggregate output and TFP. Therefore, we group firms in percentiles j according to their
degree of firm level exposure and then compute:
∆̂µmrpk,j = β̂1Exposurej + β̂2Exposure
2
j (1)
∆̂σ2mrpk,j = α̂1Exposurej + α̂2Exposure
2
j (2)
25First, we estimate lnTFPRist = β1 Exposure F irmi × Postt +X
′
iδ × Postt + γi + δst + εist. Then we
compute ̂lnTFPRist = lnTFPRist + β̂1 Exposure F irmi. Finally, we estimate the var( ̂lnTFPRi) for the
post-2002 period. Finally, we set the elasticity of substitution σ equal to 3.
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̂∆σmrpk,tfpr;j = γ̂1Exposurej + γ̂2Exposure2j (3)
Equation 1 captures the fitted value of the change of average MRPK for the j percentile
between the post- and pre-2002 period, where the coefficients come from first-difference
estimates of the treatment effect.26 Similar estimates apply for the fitted change of the
variance of MRPK and of the covariance between MRPK and TFPR in Equations 2 and 3.
Then, Sraer and Thesmar (2018) prove that the effect on aggregate TFP is given by:


















































where α is the share of capital in the Cobb-Douglas production function, which we set
at 0.33; θ is the elasticity of substitution of goods within an industry, which we set at 3;




























A.3 Baseline results with alternative variables and specifications
In this section we report the baseline results on credit allocation for the intensive mar-
gin with alternative specifications and variables. Moreover, in Figure A1 we report the
evolution of outstanding foreign claims of financial institutions located in Germany and
Luxembourg.
Table A1 reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 5 using a
balanced panel of firm-bank relations.
Table A2 reports the coefficients of a first-difference transformation of the diff-in-diff
specification in Equation 5: ∆ lnCib =
4∑
d=1
βd Ddi×Exposureb+β2 ∆ Specib+X
′
bδ+αi+εib
Table A3 reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 5 with bank-
time fixed effects: lnCibt =
3∑
d=1
βd Ddi×Exposureb×Postt+β2 Specibt+αit+γib+µbt+ εibt.
Given the presence of bank-time fixed effects, we need to omit a category, which is low-
productivity & low-collateral, so the coefficients should be interpreted as the marginal
difference with respect to the excluded category. Moreover, we no longer have the ex-
ante bank controls times the post dummy, as these are absorbed by the bank-year fixed
effects.
26Specifically, following Sraer and Thesmar (2018), we run ∆µmrpk,j = β1Exposurej +β2Exposure2j + εj .
64
Table A4 reports the coefficients of the baseline specification in Equation 5, but firms’
characteristics are computed based on their 2002-2007 average.






















































































Cross-border claims to the rest of the world
(banking sector)
Germany Luxembourg
Source: BIS. Foreign claims of banks located in Germany and Luxembourg to the banks located in the rest
of the world (nominal USD).
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Table A1: Misallocation by firms’ characteristics, balanced panel, intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MRPK TFPR Collateral MRPK / TFPR /
Exposureb ∗ Postt∗: (fixed assets) collateral collateral
High 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.45***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)










Firm-F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Bank Controls ! ! ! ! !
Specialization ! ! ! ! !
Observations 1,307,788 1,491,312 1,491,312 1,307,788 1,491,312
Adj.R2 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the specification in Equation 5 using a balanced
panel of firm-bank relations. The dependent variable, lnCibt, is the log of outstanding credit
between bank b and firm i in year t. We show the results of bank exposure to foreign capi-
tal flows by firm types, where firms are divided along a productivity dimension (above and
below the sectoral average) and credit constraint (fixed assets above and below the sectoral
average). The variable Exposureb captures bank exposure to foreign capital flows, defined
as the foreign liability ratio over the period 1998-2000. Bank controls include bank character-
istics measured in 1998-2000 interacted with a post-2002 dummy, these are log-assets, share
of NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the capital ratio. Specialization is a dummy that captures
if a firm operates in a sector in which the bank specializes its lending activities. All regres-
sions include firm-year fixed effects and firm-bank dummies. Standard errors are clustered
at the bank-sector (2-digit) level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *
significant at the 10% level.
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Table A2: Misallocation by firms’ characteristics, first difference, intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MRPK TFPR Collateral MRPK / TFPR /
Exposureb ∗ Postt∗: (fixed assets) collateral collateral
High 0.055*** 0.048*** 0.043***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008)










Firm-F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Bank Controls ! ! ! ! !
Specialization ! ! ! ! !
Observations 249,687 334,319 332,656 248,574 332,656
Adj.R2 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43




βd Ddi × Exposureb + β2 ∆ Specibt + X
′
bδ + αi + εib. The dependent
variable ∆ lnCib is the difference between the post (2002-2007) and pre (1998-2001) period
of the log of outstanding credit between bank b and firm i. We show the results of bank
exposure to foreign capital flows by firm types, where firms are divided along a produc-
tivity dimension (above and below the sectoral average) and credit constraint (fixed assets
above and below the sectoral average). The variable Exposureb captures bank exposure to
foreign capital flows, defined as the foreign liability ratio over the period 1998-2000. Bank
controls include bank characteristics measured in 1998-2000, these are log-assets, share of
NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the capital ratio. Specialization is a dummy that captures if a
firm operates in a sector in which the bank specializes its lending activities. All regressions
include firm-year fixed effects and firm-bank dummies. Standard errors are clustered at
the bank-sector (2-digit) level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *
significant at the 10% level.
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Table A3: Misallocation by firms’ characteristics, with bank-time fixed effects, intensive
margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MRPK TFPR Collateral MRPK / TFPR /
Exposureb ∗ Postt∗: (fixed assets) collateral collateral
High 0.135*** 0.228*** 0.236***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)









Firm-time F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Bank-time F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Firm-bank F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Specialization ! ! ! ! !
Observations 2,689,020 3,183,909 3,183,909 2,689,020 3,183,909
Adj.R2 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the specification in Equation 5. The dependent
variable, lnCibt, is the log of outstanding credit between bank b and firm i in year t. We show
the results of bank exposure to foreign capital flows by firm types, where firms are divided
along a productivity dimension (above and below the sectoral average) and credit constraint
(fixed assets above and below the sectoral average), the Low-Productivity and Low-Collateral
are the excluded categories. The variable Exposureb captures bank exposure to foreign cap-
ital flows, defined as the foreign liability ratio over the period 1998-2000. Specialization is a
dummy that captures if a firm operates in a sector in which the bank specializes its lending
activities. All regressions include firm-year fixed effects and firm-bank dummies. Standard
errors are clustered at the bank-sector (2-digit) level. ***significant at the 1% level, ** signifi-
cant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
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Table A4: Misallocation by post-2002 firms’ characteristics, intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MRPK TFPR Collateral MRPK / TFPR /
Exposureb ∗ Postt∗: (fixed assets) collateral collateral
High02−07 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.46***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)










Firm-time F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Firm-bank F.E. ! ! ! ! !
Bank Controls ! ! ! ! !
Specialization ! ! ! ! !
Observations 2,628,302 2,894,797 2,894,797 2,628,302 2,894,797
Adj.R2 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the specification similar to Equation 5, where firms’
are grouped according to their characteristics in the 2002-07 period. The dependent variable,
lnCibt, is the log of outstanding credit between bank b and firm i in year t. We show the
results of bank exposure to foreign capital flows by firm types, where firms are divided along
a productivity dimension (above and below the sectoral average) and credit constraint (fixed
assets above and below the sectoral average). The variable Exposureb captures bank expo-
sure to foreign capital flows, defined as the foreign liability ratio over the period 1998-2000.
Bank controls include bank characteristics measured in 1998-2000 interacted with a post-2002
dummy, these are log-assets, share of NPLs, core-funding ratio, and the capital ratio. Special-
ization is a dummy that captures if a firm operates in a sector in which the bank specializes
its lending activities. All regressions include firm-year fixed effects and firm-bank dummies.
Standard errors are clustered at the bank-sector (2-digit) level. ***significant at the 1% level,
** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
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